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CONTRIBUTIONS TO EMPLOYEES' TRUST FUNDS
Two vexing problems have arisen as by-products of an employer's
contribution of real estate or other non-liquid assets to his employees'
pension trust when they are not made pursuant to an approved
plan.' These problems are: (i) May the employer take an income tax
deduction for such a contribution, and if so, is the measure of the
deduction the present fair market value of the property or the basis
2
of the property in his hands? (2) If a deduction is allowed to the extent
of the present value of the property, does the employer owe a capital
gains tax on the appreciation in value?3
The recent case of United States v. General Shoe Corp.4 presented
both of the above questions. The defendant owned real estate with a
fair market value in 1951-52 that was considerably greater than its
cost.5 Although he was not legally obligated to do so, the defendant
contributed the real estate to an employees' pension trust and deducted
the fair market value on its income tax return for the taxable years
of 1951-52. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the de-
ductions on the ground that they were not allowable under section
1656 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and that even if they
'When contributions are made pursuant to a "plan" which has been approved
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's office, then section 404 of the 1954
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to pension trusts is applicable and such con-
tributions may be deducted as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
'The basis of an asset has roughly been defined as its cost plus capital im-
provements less any depreciation allowed or allowable.
3Appreciation is represented by the difference between the basis of the property
in the hands of the donor and its fair market value at the time of transfer.
'282 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. ig6o), reversing CCH 1959 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (59-1
U.S. Tax Cas.) 9178 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 1959).
GThe fair market value of the property involved was disputed in the District
Court, but the determination that the defendant's contention was sound was not con-
tested on appeal.
ORevenue Act of 1936, § 165, added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 862 (1942), (now Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 401-404). These code sections relate to employee stock bonus,
profit sharing, and pension trust plans. Requirements for these programs are spelled
out so that contributions made to them will be deductible as ordinary and necessary
business expenses as provided by other related code sections and at the same time
be nontaxable as income to the employee. The Revenue Act of 1936, § 165 was re-
adopted as Int. Rev. Code of i939, § 165, ch. 1, 53 Stat. 67 (s93g).
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were allowable, the defendant owed'a capital gains tax on the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the property on the date
of transfer and the basis. The District Court7 held for the taxpayer
in both instances, but the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to a deduction but
owed the capital gains tax demanded by the Commissioner.
In order to understand the situation involved, it is first necessary
to consider the nature of pension trusts. While employers have sought
to reward their employees with larger incomes and benefits for many
years, modern pension planning did not begin until 1942. The Rev-
enue Act of 19428 provided for deferred compensation to the em-
ployee and also continued to permit an employer to deduct as an or-
dinary and necessary business expense° the amounts contributed to any
plan in the nature of a trust to supplement employees' income when
they reach retirement age. However, it added the provision that "the
employee pays no tax on the employer's contribution until he act-
ually receives the money, and then the payment will be taxed only
at the capital gain rate if his share is paid out within a single year
on account of his separation from the service of the employer. If the
employee [as well as the employer] has contributed to the plan fund,
and periodic payments are made to him after retirement, his contri-
butions are returned to him tax free by averaging a deduction for
these contributions against his life expectancy."' 1 Only those pension
trusts that "qualify" by conforming to specifications spelled out by
the Internal Revenue Code" and in the regulations12 are entitled to
7General Shoe Corp. v. United States, CCH ig5 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (59-1
U.S. Tax Cas.) 9178 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 1959).
'Revenue Act of 1936, § 165, added by ch. 6ig, 56 Stat. 862 (1942) (now InL
Rev. Code of 1954 § 404). Prior to 1942, § 165 of the Internal Revenue Code related
only to nontaxability of the income received by penson trusts.
'Employer contributions to pension trusts were first allowed as deductions for
ordinary and necessary business expenses by the Revenue Act of 1928, § 23(q), ch.
852, 45 Stat. 802 (1928). This provision was substantially reenacted in the Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 23(p), ch. 1, 53 Stat. 15 (1939) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 404(a)).
'Il CCH Pension Plan Guide 3o6 (196o). The provision specifically relating to
the treatment of payments received by an employee pursuant to a qualified pension
plan may be found.in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 165(b) and (c), added by ch. 619,
56 Stat. 863 (1942) (now Int. Rev. of 1954, § 402(a)).
U1Int" Rev. Code of 1939, § 165(a), added by ch. 69, 56 Stat. 862 (1942) (now
Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 40(a)).
"Treas. Reg. §§ i.4oi-i through 5 (195 6). The regulations pertaining to Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 165 are cited as Treas. Reg. iii §§ 29.165-1 through 5. When
the Treasury Regulations were promulgated they incorporated many Revenue
Rulings and similar pronouncements by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
of what he thought the law was pertaining to pension trusts prior to the effective
date of the regulations.
1961] CASE COMMENTS
this special treatment. It was originally thought that one of the re-
quirements for such a plan was that contributions must be made on
a periodic basis pursuant to some fixed obligation of the employer.13
However, the 1951 case of Lincoln Electric Co. Employees' Trust v.
Commissioner14 held that such an obligation or plan was not a neces-
sary prerequisite for contributions to employee pension trusts to be
deductible under section 23(p) of the 1939 Code.15 The Court of Ap-
peals in the instant case specifically followed the Lincoln Electric
decision and held the contributions deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense.' 6
Once it was determined that the General Shoe Company was en-
titled to a business deduction, the amount 6f the deduction became
the issue in controversy-the Commissioner contending that it should
be limited to the basis of the property in the donor's hands, and the
taxpayer taking the position that it should be the fair market value
of the property on the date of transfer. In other areas of tax law, fair
market value has been held to constitute the basis of business deduc-
tions' 7 and a close analogy to the situation in the principal case may
"1 It is not a necessary condition to the "qualification" of an employees' trust
that the plan establishing the trust include a fixed or predetermined formula for
determining the amount of an employer's contribution. McClintock-Trunkey Co.
v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Produce Reporter Co.,
207 F.zd 586 (7th Cir. 1953); Lincoln Electric Co. Employee's Profit-Sharing Trust
v. Commissioner, 19o F.2d 326 (6th Cir. ig5i); Treas. Reg. § i.4 oi-i(b)(i)(ii).
Corresponding regulations under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code have been retro-
actively amended to conform to the regulations in this area under the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 in T.D. 6189, 1956 Cum. Bull. 972. Earlier Revenue Rulings
on the same point have been modified in Rev. Proc. 56-22, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 1380
and Rev. Rul. 56-366, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 976.
1419o F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1951).
',See statutes cited at note 9 supra.
"The Lincoln Electric case was decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 165.
Pursuant to that section, employer contributions to employee pension trusts were
deductible as a general business expense. However, Int. Rev. Code of 1954 specifically
states that such contributions are not to be deducted under § 162 pertaining to
general business expenses or § 212 relating to expenses for the production of income
but must be deducted under § 404(a) as a separate category of business expenses.
See also, Commissioner v. Surface Combustion Corp., 181 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 195o).
Because the contributions in the principal case were gratuitous, the further pos-
sibility arose that they might be deductible under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162
(substantially the same as Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23) which pertains to general
business expenses. It has been held that gifts from which even slight benefit may
be expected are so deductible. Spang-Chalfant & Co., 9 B.T.A. 858 (1927) (non-
deductible); Live Stock Nat'l Bank, 7 B.T.A. 413 (1927); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15
(1958). For an excellent discussion in this area see 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxa-
tion § 25.115 (1954). In its opinion the court did not investigate this possibility
because it sought other grounds upon which to base its decision.
17Campbell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5 th Cir. 1954); White v. Brodrick, 104 F.
Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1952); Package Mach. CO., 28 B.T.A. 980 (1933) (basis of stock
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logically be drawn. This analogy must have been persuasive since the
court cited no authority 8 for sustaining the defendant's position.
The disposition that was made of these points inevitably led the
court to a question that had not been faced for seventeen years.19
That is, must the taxpayer pay a capital gains tax on the difference
between the fair market value of the property transferred and the basis
of that property in the hands of the donor? In order for a capital
gains tax to be allowed or required, the conditions of sections iooi
and 100220 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code must be met. The
pertinent parts of these sections are as follows:
Section 1001
"(a) Computation of Gain or Loss.-The gain from the sale or
other disposition of property shall be the excess of the amount
realized, therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section
ioii for determining gain....
(b) Amount Realized. -The amount realized from the sale or
other disposition of property shall be the sum of any money re-
ceived plus the fair market value of the property (other than
money) received ..
Section 1oo2
"Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, on the sale
or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss,
determined under section 1001, shall be recognized." (Emphasis
added.)
The court could plausibly have ruled that the facts of the General
Shoe case did not technically comply with either of the above quoted
sections. It is difficult to find that there was "an amount" realized, as
required by section 1O01. The taxpayer did not receive a fund of
money in return for the surrendered property, nor was any fixed obli-
gation extinguished, nor did he receive any tangible "property."
However, the court, taking a realistic approach, stated that the tax-
issued as compensation is fair market value when issued); Treas. Reg § 1.170-1(c)
(958) (fair market value at date of transfer is measure of charitable contribution).
'"It is interesting to note that while the General Shoe case was pending the
Tax Court also held that fair market value is the proper measure of a deduction
allowable to the donor of property to a pension trust. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 30 T.C.
933 (1958).
vThe only previous case which had faced these identical issues was Internation-
al Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 31o (2d Cir. x943) in which Judge
Frank wrote an opinion with which Judges Learned Hand and Chase concurred.
In that case it was held that a capital gains tax was payable on the appreciation of
stock transferred to employees as a bonus for services rendered.
20inL Rev. Code of 1954, § ioot is the same as Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § iii,
ch. 1, 53 Stat. 27 (1939).
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payer realized his "money's worth"2 ' in making the transfer of property
and equated that phrase with "amount realized." By first accepting, as
the court did, that "the tax statutes do not operate in theory-they are
practical,"22 such an equation becomes entirely valid. Other cases
have held that the taxpayer received his "money's worth" in related
situations,23 and the use of the same analogy in the present situation
does not appear incorrect. Judge Thornton, in the court's opinion,
forthrightly stated that the decision stepped outside the letter of the
law:
"The theory of economic gain comes into play. To argue, as the
taxpayer does here, that there can be no gain because nothing
is realized, is unrealistic. Literally the taxpayer is correct in
its contention that it did not receive a tangible benefit... how-
ever, we do not conceive that in this day and age we are re-
stricted to tangibles in tax matters where there is actual recog-
nizable benefit, albeit intangible, the taxation of which is im-
plicit in the statutory scheme, and where such benefit is clearly
capable of being evaluated on an objective basis."
24
It is clear from the court's opinion that the General Shoe case
stands on the reasoning of International Freighting Corp. v. Commis-
sioner25 which held that a company had "realized an amount" equal
to the fair market value of stock transferred to its employees when such
stock was intended to be a bonus for services rendered. Freighting
'The court felt that the taxpayer was receiving the intangible benefits of
employee loyalty, added desire to do good work, and the possibility of not having
to pay additional wages when it transferred the property involved to an employee
pension trust. It was therefore held that the taxpayer received his "money's worth"
for the property.
nUnited States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 196o).
'The phrase, "money's worth" seems to have had its beginning in Helvering
v. Horst, 311 US. 112, 117 (1940) which distinguished Blair v. Commissioner, 300
U.S. 5 (1937), and compare Burnett v. Leininger, 285 US. 136 (1932) and Lucas v.
Earl, 281 U.S. iii (ig3o). The same phrase again appeared in Commissioner v.
Mesta, 123 F.2d 986, 988 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 695 (1942), rehearing
denied, 317 U.S. 704 (1942), wherein it was said, "We think that we make the prac-
tical assumption that a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value
for an unliquidated claim is getting his money's worth." Subsequently other cases
were decided which used the same line of reasoning, e.g., Commissioner v. Halliwell,
I1 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 US. 741 (1943); Kenan v. Commis-
sioner, 114 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 194o); King, 3i T.C. io8 (1958); Hall 9 T.C. 53
(1947); Rev. Rul. 57-507, 57-2 Cum. Bull. 511.
See also Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (193o) which dealt with
the reasonableness of "gratuitous" bonuses as compensation. In that case the tax-
payer alleged that the bonuses should be deductible since he received the same
advantages he would have enjoyed had he paid the money in salaries.
2'United States v. General Shoe Corp., supra note 22, at 12 (Emphasis added.)
= 13 5 F.2d 31o (2d Cir. 1943).
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leans heavily upon the authority of Commissioner v. Mesta26 which
held that an individual "realized an amount" equal to the fair market
value of property transferred to his estranged wife pursuant to a di-
vorce decree. In May 196o, the same Court of Appeals that decided
the General Shoe case decided the case of Commissioner v. Marsh-
man27 which involved facts similar to those in Mesta but reached a
result opposite from Mesta. Therefore, unless Marshman could be ef-
fectively distinguished from Mesta, General Shoe would appear to
stand on unsecure ground. In General Shoe, the Sixth Circuit
did not try to distinguish Marshman from Mesta, but distinguished
both cases from Freighting on the ground that they were divorce cases
while Freighting involved employee-employer relations.28 It may be
concluded that this court accepted the decision of Freighting but re-
fused to concur with the authority it cites as controlling.
Turning to section 1002, it is apparent that section iooi cannot
be applied unless there is a "sale or exchange." It is curious that this
point was not raised because it does not necessarily follow that an
"amount realized" can only arise from a sale or exchange.2 Whereas,
"the terms 'sale' and 'exchange,' except as modified by statute [for
taxation purposes] are to be considered in the light of their ordinary
meaning,"30 it may not be said that the cases arising out of tax dis-
putes derived a definition of "sale" or "exchange" synonymous with the
definition which evolved from the common law.31 This difference of
approach is illustrated by the possibility that there may be a "sale" or
"exchange" for taxation purposes even without consideration or an
8123 F.2d 98M (3d Cir. 1941).
2 279 F.2d 27 (3 d Cir. ig6o). This case held that petitioner was not liable
for a capital gains tax when he surrendered to his estranged wife the right to pur-
chase S4ooooo worth of stock for $4o,0oo in a divorce proceeding. The court reasoned
that the husband had not realized a taxable "amount" because what he received
for the right to purchase the stock was not necessarily S36o,ooo ($400,000-
$4oooo), the fair market value of the transaction, but some indeterminable benefit
that one receives from being divorced.
16It is noted that Mesta, Maxshman and Halliwell all involved property settle-
ments in divorce proceedings whereas Freighting dealt with arms' length trans-
actions between an employer and his employees.
2E.g., gift and inheritance.
3B Mertens, Fecderal Income Taxation § 22.92 (1954). For a collection of cases
which have at least paid lip service to this proposition see note 8o following § 22.92.
sl1%hereas this comment does not attempt to define the elusive term "sale" as
derived from the long history of exchange transactions between people dealing at
arms' length, it is generally conceded that a sale is traditionally thought of as
a contract which necessarily implies a consideration. Vold, Sales 65 n.62 (2d ed.
1959).
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amount realized.3 2 However, once the court found a consideration in
"money's worth," it simply assumed that the sum total of the transac-
don resulted in a sale or exchange within the meaning .of section 002
and forthwith found a capital gains tax due. Although the assumption
that a sale or exchange occurred is probably valid, the opinion of the
court would have been more complete if the rationale of the assump-
tion had been given.
While the court made a tenable statutory interpretation in reaching
its final conclusion, it is conceivable that the same court could have
reached an opposite conclusion by using section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code33 which relates to deductions for charitable contri-
tions.34 From the outset, it must be remembdred that a deduction al-
lowable under section 170 is not to be confused with a deduction for
business expenses; the charitable deduction is granted for an entirely
different policy reason than the business deductions.3 5 From a donor
'Helvering v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 666 (1949),
affirming per curiam, 115 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 194o) held that a loss sustained by
the taxpayer was a capital loss from a "sale or exchange" even though the tax-
payer was under no obligation to accept the loss. Therefore the taxpayer was given
the benefit of a "sale" without surrendering any consideration. See also Bert B.
Burnquist, 44 B.T.A. 484 (1941); James B. Lapsley, 44 B.T.A. 11o5 (1941); John
A. O'Keefe, 44 B.T.A. 290 (1941). Compare IV. W. Hoffman, 40 B.T.A. 459 (1939)-
nSubstantially the same as Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(0) and (q), ch. ", 53 Stat.
14-15 (1939)-
"The pertinent parts of Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 17o are as follows:
"(a) Allowance of Deduction-
(i) General Rule.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable
contribution (as defined in subsection (c)) payment of which is made
within the taxable )ear....
"(c) Charitable Contribution Defined-For purposes of this section, the
term 'charitable contribution' means a contribution or gift to or for the
use or-....
(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation ....
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, sci-
entific, literary, or educational purposes or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals .... "
There is a limitation put on corporate charitable contributions pursuant to Int.
Rev. Code § 17 o(b)(2) of 5 per cent of taxable income for any one given year with a
carry-over provision for the next two succeeding years.
'11hereas the deduction for business expenses is allowed so that the taxpayer
does not have to pay a tax on that which is not truly income, but a return of
capital, the charitable deduction is allowed to encourage private individuals and
corporations to make donations to worthy organizations. Congress did not intend
any overlap between the two provisions, as is shown by the following:
"At the present time corporations are allowed a deduction for charitable
contributions up to a limit ,of 5 percent of their income otherwise subject
to tax. In addition, they are allowed to take as business-expense deductions
contributions to charitable and other organizations where the institution
is to render a service commensurate to the contribution. However, where
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corporation's point of view, section 170 treatment of a donation is
preferable to section 404(a) treatment of the same donation because
there is no capital gains tax payable on the appreciation in the former
situation. 36 Moreover, the precedent set in Freighting imposes such an
obligation in the latter. There is, however, a common meeting ground
on which sections 404(a) and 170 converge. That meeting ground is sec-
tion 50137 which exempts from federal income taxation certain enu-
merated classes of corporations, pension trusts being one class, and
charitable corporations being another. If the policy which gave rise to
the establishment of the charitable deduction permiued in section 170
were held to be the same policy which would encourage an employer to
create a pension trust for the benefit of his employees, it would not
have been unreasonable for the court to state that section 170 treat-
ment was applicable in the General Shoe case. Strengthening this hypo-
thetical argument that section 17o is applicable to the instant situation
is a line of decisions arising out of taxation disputes holding that a
fund for employees is a charitable organization so that its income is
nontaxable.48 The holding that these funds are charitable organiza-
tions for one purpose within the meaning of section 170 would be per-
suasive when another purpose is involved.
no service is rendered, a business-expense deduction may not be taken for
amounts not allowable as charitable contributions only because they are in
excess of the 5 percent limitation." H.R. Rep. No. 133 7, 83rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 20 (1954).
5"Section i-o(d) defines a 'charitable contribution' as a 'contribution or gift'
without limiting the term to transfers of money, or to the cost basis in the donor's
hands or other property transferred. Treasury Regulations construing similar
sections in prior law have long recognized that the fair market value of property
given to charity constitutes a deduction from the donor's income." U. So. Cal., z957
Tax Inst. 7o7. In situations arising in this area, the Commissioner has not even
asserted that a tax is payable on the appreciation of the donated property. Camp-
bell v. Prothro, 2o9 F.d 331 (5th Cir. 1954); White v. Brodrick, 1o4 F. Supp. 213
(D. Kan. 1952); Champlin v. Broderick, CCH 1948 Stand Fed. Tax Rep. (1948-2
U.S. Tax Cas.) ' 9332; Treas Reg. § 1.17O-i(c) (1956), formerly under Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 23(0); Rev. Rul. 55-138, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 223 (discussing methods
to determine fair market value of property donated).
TInt. Rev. Code of 1954, substantially the same as Int. Rev. Code of 1938, § soi,
ch. 1, 53 Star 32 (1939).
mGimbel v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 78o (3d Cir. 1931), citing Egan v. Com-
missioner, 43 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. x93o); Bok v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616 (3d Cir.
1930); Proctor Patterson, 34 B.T.A. 689 0936), appeal dismissed, go F.2d io6
(6th Cir. 1937); Young Men's Christian Ass'n Retirement Fund, Inc., 18 B.TA.
139 11929): John R. Sibley, 16 B.T-A. 915 (1929); G.C-,%L 19i28, 1937-2 Cur. Bull.
125. The charitable quality of similar organizations is destroyed if the beneficiaries
themselves make a major portion of the contributions. Lindback Foundation v.
Commissioner, 4 T.C. 652 (1945), aff'd, 150 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1945); E. Huddleston,
13 T.C.M. 395 (1954); Rev. Rul. 58-264, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 144.
